The ethnic cleansing did not come as a surprise, regardless of the debates over it being systematic or sporadic in execution.

It bore the same strain of subrational cruelty and mass hysteria that seedlings of mistrust and hate bear when their demons mature.

And Rwanda’s mass fratricide was rooted in the same existential causes as other large scale mortal betrayals – unmitigated social injustices, economic inequities, and political struggles.

These 3 causes and the overlapping diminished social cohesion measure how fragile a state is, according to the Fund for Peace. 

To the unsuspecting observer, these triad of tragedies are often masked in a cloak of racial, ethnic, or religious superiority. 

A commentary on this deception in Rwanda, 30 Aprils ago, has it that:

“To make the economic, social and political conflict look more like an ethnic conflict, the President’s entourage, including the army, launched propaganda campaigns to fabricate events of ethnic crisis caused by the Tutsi and the RPF. The process was described as “mirror politics”, also known as “accusation in a mirror” whereby a person accuses others of what the person himself/herself actually wants to do.”

This same tragedy eventually evolves everywhere these lies are conserved, from Burundi and Rwanda to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The genocide, an immediate development from the Rwandan Civil War, saw the Hutus target the minority Tutsi population for annihilation through the vilest murders and ancillary afflictions like public rape and mass infection of surviving Tutsi women with HIV/AIDS.

These horrors lasted 100 days, between April 7 and July 19, 1994, leaving in its toll 800,000 murdered souls and mutilated bodies, mostly of ethnic Tutsis, and moderate Hutus and Twas. 

An estimated 250,000 to 500,000 women were raped, and over 2 million displaced.

Thirty years after the genocide, Rwanda continues its efforts at recovery to ensure the state is less fragile. It continues rebuilding a country that is less vulnerable to a crisis situation like the 1994 episode.

Rwanda still has a long way to go. So are the other 53 divided states of Africa.

Remembering Rwanda offers all a time to reflect on the social, economic and political challenges of their communities, counties, and countries.

It’s a time to reflect on the arguments that each suffer because their neighbour was born by an accident of nature into the other ethnic group or into the family of adherents of the other religion. 

It’s a time to rethink the elites wearing ethno-religious coats on their naked ineptitude to deliver things so basic to a more cohesive and less chaotic life for all.

It’s time to ask: How fragile is my community? How fair is the social, economic, political systems in my county? And how far is my country today from April 7, 1994, somewhere in Rwanda?

Rwanda: How Fragile?

Rwanda’s road to stability has been slow but steady, judging by its State fragility in the last 18 years.

The Fragile States Index, measured by The Fund for Peace, shows that civil war or genocide is less likely to occur in Rwanda now than it was before. 

The country’s 2023 state fragility score is the lowest and best in the last 18 years. 

On the global ratings, Rwanda is the 44th most fragile country out of 179, with a fragility score of 82.3 out of 120.

This indicates that Rwanda is not out of the woods yet but is working hard to ensure the country never experiences another major upset.

Its highest and worst score in the last 18 years was in 2006, 12 years after the 1994 genocide. Then, the country recorded a high fragility score of 92.9 out of 120, ranking as the 24th most fragile state in the world.

According to The Fund for Peace, “The fragility State Index measures the vulnerability of states to collapse.” The Index is measured by summing up each country’s score in 4 key indicators. The score for each indicator is also the sum of its 3 sub-indicators:

Lack of Cohesion

One of the factors that spurred Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 was the ethnic divide, which pre-dated the country’s independence in 1962.

Also, the history of the genocide revealed that the armed forces were factionalised – the Hutu majority government armed forces and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by Tutsi exiles in Uganda.

In 1993, hardline Hutus launched their Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) radio channel. The channel was used to incite hatred towards the Tutsis by using propaganda and racist ideologies such as the Hutu Ten Commandments.

These funded and fanned embers of Hutu hatred against Tutsis led to full scale genocide in April 1994. 

Currently, the country is becoming more cohesive. Its threats to cohesion score was reduced from 22.8 in 2022 to 22.2 in 2023 out of 30. (0 = No Cohesion problems; 30 = Highest Cohesion problem).

Under the Cohesion Indicators, Rwanda’s Security Apparatus score is 5.2 out of 10. This indicates that Rwanda is a moderately secure state. The security threat level from rebel force movements or militias is not very high, and the citizens have a measure of trust in domestic security.

The Factionalized elites score of Rwanda is 8 out of 10.

According to the Fund of Peace, “The factionalised elite indicator measures the fragmentation of the state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines… It also factors the use of nationalistic political rhetorics by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism… or communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”).”

The factionalised elite indicator is measured considering the questions around identity:

1. National Identity: Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
2. Extremist Rhetorics: Does Hate Media and radio exist?
3. Stereotyping: Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent, and is there scapegoating?
4. Cross-cultural Respect: Does cross-cultural respect exist?

The high score implies that there is still a high measure of fragmentation among the ethnic groups in Rwanda.

Their score on group grievance is the highest among the cohesion indicators: 9 out of 10. This implies that there is still a very high number of aggrieved groups in Rwanda.

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The report, which focuses on the budget performances and challenges in the state’s health sector, resulted from extensive research by the organisations.

The report noted a significant reduction in the budget deviation of its health budget, decreasing from 46% in 2017 to just 2% in 2019.

It also stated that in the same period, the highest underspending was 48% in 2018 and the least underspending of 2% in 2021. Non-release of approved funds and problems associated with government prioritisation of approved projects were highlighted as responsible for the shortfall in budgetary expenditures on health in the report.

A review of the report shows that while the government had a high budget performance in terms of personnel expenditure, it performed abysmally on health infrastructure, with an approved budget of N23.2 million and actual releases of N2.9 million, with an 88% negative deviation that amounts to N20.3 billion.

Health programs also suffered, with an approved budget of N10.1 billion and an actual release of N1.3 billion between 2017 and 2021. 

In 2021, the government budgeted N3.1 million on health infrastructure but only spent N1.8 million, the highest amount between 2017 and 2021. In 2018, it budgeted N7.8 billion but only spent N400 million. 

Of note are the findings of the state’s spending on medical supplies and equipment during the COVID-19 period between 2019 and 2020.

Zero naira was spent on medical supplies in 2020 and zero on medical equipment in the same period.

It was mentioned in the report that funds approved on paper were not released, “inhibiting budget implementation and the mobilisation of resources necessary for full implementation of health services.”. Bureaucratic hurdles were also identified as a reason for delays in the release of funds. 

“Research findings show that the Niger State Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) typically receives less than 13% of its allocated budget to implement five key programs. 2017, only 142 million naira out of the 1.1 billion naira budgeted for these programs was released, marking the highest amount released between 2017 and 2020, equivalent to 13% of the budget.” the report noted.

It was also stated that the situation persisted in 2018, with the agency receiving a mere 2% of its budget, as only 28 million naira of the 2 billion naira budgeted was released.” 

Some issues with the prioritisation of spending noted include Political interference, late cash releases, and social and health problems.

Recommendations in the report include Improving financial forecasting and ensuring better alignment with approved budgets, transparency and participation in budget processes.

The report also clarified why MDAs’ memos are being disregarded, which leads to confusion and hindrance in the budget execution process. 

It submitted that “the government must ensure transparency and adopt clear communication and feedback processes to inform MDAs of the reasons for rejecting requests for fund releases.”

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Dataphyte, an organisation dedicated to providing access to data, research services, and training, has released a comprehensive study examining the agenda-setting role of the Nigerian media, particularly in election coverage. 

Titled “The Media’s Agenda-Setting Role: Insights from Coverage of Nigeria’s 2023 Elections,” the study assessed the nature of media coverage during the 2023 elections in Nigeria, aiming to identify key elements shaping narratives and assessing the media’s effectiveness in providing education and information during the electoral process.

Covering 10 national and 36 state media outlets across 18 strategically selected states, the study monitored online/print, TV, and radio platforms. The national media outlets monitored include Arise TV, Channels, DailyTrust, NTA, Premium Times, and The Cable.

Analysis of the topics covered by the media during the 2023 Elections revealed a significant focus on non-programmatic issues, such as election logistics, party politics and campaigns, corruption scandals and controversies, comprising 80% of news items monitored. Programmatic topics like education, health, vulnerable groups, humanitarian issues, and security received less focus, accounting for only 20% of coverage.

The report also highlighted the underrepresentation of women in media coverage, with only 0.4% of news stories focusing on gender-related topics, indicating a gap in mainstreaming gender discourse in Nigerian politics. Other findings in this report include the origin and sources of the voices that shaped the election narrative and their political affiliations.

“The outcome of this research underscores the media’s vital role in shaping public discourse and influencing electoral outcomes,” said Oluseyi Olufemi, Insight Lead at Dataphyte. “With this media monitoring exercise, we aim to stimulate dialogue and encourage self-assessment within the media industry on its role in sustaining democracy and the responsibility of information and education that rests on its shoulders. 

In conclusion, the report emphasises the need for greater focus on programmatic issues like education, healthcare, and gender equality to foster informed public discourse during elections. Media organisations are urged to represent diverse voices and viewpoints, ensure balanced coverage, and highlight more gender-related issues.

The full report, “The Media’s Agenda-Setting Role: Insights from Coverage of Nigeria’s 2023 Elections,” is available on Dataphyte’s website: https://bit.ly/The-Medias-Agenda-Setting-Role

Signed by
Joshua Olufemi
Founder, Dataphyte

The post Dataphyte Releases Report on Role of Media in Nigeria’s 2023 Elections Coverage appeared first on Dataphyte United Kingdom.

On June 4, 2021, the Nigerian government banned the operations of microblogging site, Twitter, stating that the company’s activities are “capable of undermining Nigeria’s corporate existence”. Some have argued that the government’s action was not really predicated on a democratic concern about Twitter’s influence on Nigeria’s politics, but a vindictive reaction to the platform’s deletion of President Buhari’s violence-invoking, anti-Biafra Tweet. Yet, regardless of whether the Nigerian government’s decision was reactionary or truly democratic, Nigeria’s Twitter ban feeds into a broader global concern about the big techs’ monopolising power over social conversations.

The influence of digital tech platforms has permeated all aspects of global politics and economy — from being able to disrupt the stock market (the GameStop short squeeze on Reddit) and making cross-border tax regulations more difficult (intangibility of assets), to the risks of data surveillance and misinformation. More worryingly, big techs’ reach far outpaces the extent to which governments and international institutions have been able to regulate their activities. This reach produces impacts in the most unusual ways, raising a fundamental concern of whether the powers of social media platforms could truly be checked by the government.

The consequences of a heavily digitised globe are innumerable — from concerns of data privacy to cross-border inconsistency in data governance; cybersecurity; as well as misinformation and content moderation during important political moments. As a result, governments are becoming resistant of the scarcely regulated world of data assets in which big social media companies are in possession of large amount of customers’ data that are rarely subject to public accountability (for instance, data on the numeric and demographic composition of Twitter users are publicly unavailable, while historic big data on trends/hashtags is only available to academic researchers). 

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As such, there have been numerous regulations or efforts targeting the governance and economic dynamics of digital tech —such as the push for a special antitrust law for big techs in the US,  the Global Data Protection Regulation and Digital Sovereignty frameworks in the EU. Such policies that are generally “governance” and “economically ” oriented have moved swiftly across the global south, as we begin to see a solid policy reaction in developing (African) countries in the areas of data protection (e.g., the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation), the digital economy, cybersecurity, and data sharing. 

Regulating the Political side of the Digital

However, despite these policy footprints, the political dimensions of social media impact have remained much-less regulated — more so on the African continent. Yet, the positive and negative externalities of social media on politics are wide-ranging than are often discussed. Too many times, countries focus only on disinformation and propaganda; yet the virtual world of social media has darker side-effects than just ‘fake news’ during elections. For instance, since voters’ source of information has hugely shifted from traditional media to the digital, many risk being locked in an echo chamber, where a specific set of information (even if correct) is repeatedly fed to a group of people based on their digital profile. Combined with the fact that many social media platforms like Twitter lend convenience to ‘brevity’ rather than an elaborate analysis of political issues, unaudited algorithms would swiftly lead to the distortion of political views — increasing political polarisation — even if actors are acting on a factual set of information. 

The chart below illustrates 5-umbrella areas where big tech platforms significantly impact politics. 

While many of the pain points within each umbrella area above require a complex interaction of government, citizens, and social media operators, the highlights in red suggest areas that require the sole attention of social media administrators. 

When it comes to elections, platforms like Twitter function as a townhall of ideas, where journalists and citizens reel out and monitor live updates on the voting process, civil society organisations mobilise and orientate the public, and policy makers share resources to keep the political conversation alive. For instance, during the 2019 general elections, many media organisations curated Twitter hashtags like #SnapandSend and #NigeriaDecides to mobilise citizens around a common resource and provide real-time results from each polling unit.  Yet, while such free speech could flourish more easily with Twitter, determining “whose” speech flourishes is another dynamic that raises concern on the extent of the platform’s sovereignty in content moderation.   In the Tweet deletion controversy between the Nigerian government and Twitter, the FG rightly pointed out that Twitter had paid very little attention to censoring the divisive hate speech that pro-Biafra leader, Nnamdi Kanu, consistently churned out on the platform. Twitter operators only began deleting Nnamdi Kanu’s Tweets 24 hours after the Nigerian government imposed a ban on the platform. Such selective moderation rarely catches the public’s attention. Whether President Buhari’s Tweets violated Twitter’s engagement rules isn’t up for debate, it sure did; the bigger concern is the lack of accountability and double standard that was swift to censor the President but let other non-state actors have a free day violating the platform’s engagement rules.  There was also Twitter’s lack of poor procedural engagement with the government prior to the Tweet deletion.

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A prominent example of such ‘digital arms race’ is the ongoing US-China tech competition. This ‘Great Tech Rivalry’ as we know it broadly plays out in two forms: the first is the protectionist approach each party takes to limit the influence of the other’s technologies on its economy. For instance, in the last few years, Washington has imposed tough sanctions on Chinese tech companies — including limiting their access to critical American technologies such as semiconductors; banning the sale and import of services or products from Huawei and ZTE; and the recent scrutinisation of TikTok, prohibiting its usage on US’ state-owned devices. America is now also heavily concerned about the national security implications of its interdependence on Chinese technologies. Nonetheless, for all its recent decoupling efforts, Washington has historically been more open to technology relations with China than China has with it. On its end, Beijing is closed to all forms of foreign competition, not just with the U.S.; as evident in its highly restrictive import regime for digital services, a highly regulated internet space, and strong data localisation laws. 

How does this competition play out in Africa?

Whichever way it swings, this tech competition could significantly impact smaller and newly digitising economies that rely on Chinese and American technologies. In recent years, both countries have been working to gain an edge and expand their influence in regions like Africa, where internet penetration is rapidly shaping socioeconomic growth. For China, the ICT sector is a strategic entry point in its quest for global economic dominance. For context, ICT constitutes about 38.6 percent of China’s GDP. Beijing has also committed to positioning itself at the forefront of global technology innovation, as seen in its 14th 5-year plan (2021-2025) and President Xi Jinping’s speech at the last CCP conference. 

A recurrent discussion in African policy circles is the need for African governments to maintain agency in their relationship with both countries, and to navigate this complex digital ecosystem in a way that benefits them without subserving the agenda of either side of the digital geopolitical divide. A key concern, however, is whether non-alignment — which scholars have argued is a more pragmatic way for Africa to manage its foreign partnerships — is possible in an internet ecosystem mostly divided between the US and China. 

This piece examines how the US-China tech competition plays out in African countries. It is divided into two sections. The first part identifies 3 key areas in Africa’s digital ecosystem where China has been most active and where its activities intersect with Washington’s interest on the continent, namely: digital infrastructure, digital services, and digital education or tech talent development. The second section discusses the geopolitical implications of these activities on the African continent.

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The work accentuates its ongoing monitoring of foreign authoritarian influence in Nigeria and Africa, examining Chinese illegal mining in Nigeria within the context of Sino-Nigerian relations. It emphasises the political implications, such as policy deficiencies and corruption.

It also advocates for Nigeria to develop structured mining policies to prevent foreign exploitation and suggests diplomatic resolutions to ensure mutual benefits and sustain a positive relationship.

The report describes how, over five decades, Sino-Nigerian relations have flourished, with Nigeria emerging as one of China’s top 40 global trading partners and the country’s main hub for investments in Africa. 

By 2023, Chinese loans accounted for 80% of Nigeria’s bilateral debt, financing various infrastructure projects. Furthermore, Nigeria has surpassed Angola and South Africa to become China’s second-largest trade partner in Africa and its top investment destination on the continent.

The report also discusses the benefits and drawbacks of Nigeria’s relationship with China. Of particular note is the rise in illegal Chinese mining in Nigeria, which has had a significant impact on politics by exposing flaws in leadership, policymaking, governance, and the security sector.

This illicit activity exacerbates environmental degradation, undermines government revenue, fuels insecurity, and strains diplomatic relations. Nigeria’s federal system creates loopholes for exploitation, while lax policies fail to regulate the mining sector effectively. 

The report also revealed that Chinese miners and corrupt government officials work together to continue an illicit cycle of activity. Ensuing insecurity puts human rights and the authority of the state in jeopardy, calling for extensive security sector reform.

Corruption further undermines democratic values and development efforts, while strained diplomatic relations with China raise concerns about indirect support for terrorist activities. 

The report suggested that addressing these challenges requires robust policy reforms, enhanced regulation, security sector reform, and anti-corruption measures.

China must also ensure its nationals adhere to mining regulations. Failure to act decisively risks further destabilising Nigeria’s socio-political landscape and undermining prospects for sustainable development and bilateral relations. 

The report concluded that resolving this issue is critical for the two countries’ future economic and diplomatic developments. 

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Dataphyte has just released a policy brief on the dynamics of foreign influence in West Africa’s security sector, focusing on the role of the West, Russia, and China.

Titled “Foreign Influence in West Africa’s Security Sector: The West, Russia, and China”, the report examined the drivers of foreign influence in West Africa’s security sector and analysed the evolution in the role of state actors in the security landscape of the region.

The lingering security concerns and the recent coups in West Africa have highlighted the need to assess the dynamics of security in the region. While there is a consistent call for African countries to explore indigenous solutions to their development challenges, there is a growing concern in the region’s relationship with external powers such as China, Russia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. 

The report also dissects prevailing scepticism among African citizens on the region’s historical ties with Western allies and the new orientation that now informs their actions and activities. 

Furthermore, the report interrogated the activities of terrorist groups in Africa and how they shape the region’s decisions on security. It also examined how the security peculiarities in the West African region have shifted the role of ECOWAS from ensuring economic integration among member states to maintaining peace and stability.

The report concluded that while the influence wielded by foreign powers on the region’s security sector is unlikely to abate, well-developed strategies can create avenues for win-win engagement between domestic actors and foreign partners.

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